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THE 1990 AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL CLEAN AIR ACT: HAS
CONGRESS BUILT A BETTER
MOUSETRAP?
By
Pamela M. Giblin *
INTRODUCTIONON November 15, 1990 President Bush signed into law the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990 (1990 Amendments).' These Amend-
ments enacted sweeping changes to the Clean Air Act (Act)2 with
the specific congressional intent of creating a strict federal regime to control
the nation's air quality. The 1990 Amendments contain important provi-
sions that change the law in six different areas: the attainment and mainte-
nance of air quality standards;3 permits and enforcement;4 hazardous
pollutants;5 acid rain deposition control;6 stratospheric ozone protection;7
and motor vehicles and fuel.8 This Article focuses primarily on the signifi-
cant changes in the provisions dealing with permitting and enforcement.
For example, the Act required only construction permits for new major
* Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Austin Office. My sincerest thanks go to my
associate Paul D. Warren, whose hard work and diligence made this article possible.
1. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7403-7671q (West Supp. 1991)).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988). The Clean Air Act was last substantially amended in
1977. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
3. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549 §§ 101-111, 104 Stat. at
2399-471.
4. Id. §§ 501, 701-11, 104 Stat. at 2635-48, 2672-85.
5. Id. §§ 301-06, 104 Stat. at 2531-84.
6. Id. §§ 401-13, 104 Stat. at 2584-634.
7. Id. §§ 601-03, 104 Stat. at 2648-72.
8. Pub. L. No. 101-549 §§ 201-35, 104 Stat. at 2471-531.
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sources9 and for modifications1o of existing major sources. The 1990
Amendments, in contrast, require such sources to obtain operating permits
in addition to construction permits, including pre-existing major sources."
Moreover, the 1990 Amendments expand the types of facilities required to
obtain either type of permit. 12 States that submit acceptable implementation
plans to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will ad-
minister the new operating permit program just as under the existing con-
struction permit program. 13
The 1990 Amendments define in great detail the minimum requirements
for operating permits. 14 Such permits must contain: enforceable emissions
limitations and standards,' 5 compliance schedules, 16 inspection, entry, and
monitoring requirements, ' 7 compliance certification and violation reporting
procedures,' 8 and other statutorily mandated conditions and measures. ' 9
The EPA will issue operating permits for a fixed term not to exceed five
years, subject to review and renewal. 20
The 1990 Amendments also create a wider range of enforcement options.
For example, the EPA now has the authority to impose administrative
fines, 2' whereas previously the EPA had to rely solely on civil or criminal
litigation. 22 In addition, the 1990 Amendments expand the types of viola-
9.
The term "major source" means any stationary source or group of stationary
sources located within a contiguous area and under common control that emits
or has the potential to emit considering controls, in the aggregate, 10 tons per
year or more of any hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any
combination of hazardous air pollutants. The Administrator may establish a
lesser quantity, or in the case of radionuclides different criteria, for a major
source than that specified in the previous sentence, on the basis of potency of the
air pollutant, persistence, potential for bioaccumulation, other characteristics of
the air pollutant, or other relevant factors.
42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
10.
The term "modification" means any physical change in, or change in the
method of operation of, a major source which increases the actual emissions of
any hazardous air pollutant emitted by such source by more than a de minimis
amount or which results in the emission of any hazardous air pollutant not pre-
viously emitted by more than a de minimis amount.
Id. § 7412(a)(5).
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7502(c)(5) (West Supp. 1991).
12. Id. § 7661(2).
13. Id. § 7661a(d)(1). Failure to submit an acceptable state implementation plan may
result in sanctions or imposition of a federal implementation plan, designed by the EPA, in the
state. Id. § 766 1a(d)(2)-(3).
14. The 1990 Amendments also require the EPA to promulgate regulations that establish
the minimum elements of an operating permit program. See id. § 7661a(b). The EPA has
prepared regulations in response to this mandate. 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712 (1991) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 70) (proposed May 10, 1991).
15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7661(c)(a).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 7661(c)(c).
18. Id.
19. Id. §§ 7661c(a), 7661e.
20. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7661a-7661f.
21. Id. § 7413(d).
22. Id. § 7413(b)-(c).
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tions subject to criminal sanctions23 and impose stiffer civil and criminal
penalties for virtually all violations.24 Furthermore, to aid the EPA in the
identification of violators, the agency can require persons responsible for
emission sources to monitor emission levels and affirmatively certify compli-
ance (or non-compliance) with specific emission limitations.25 The 1990
Amendments also contain a "bounty hunter" provision, allowing the EPA to
pay rewards of up to $10,000 to individuals providing information that leads
to the criminal conviction of a violator or to the imposition of civil
penalties. 26
The discussion that follows examines some of the new enforcement provi-
sions under the 1990 Amendments and the possible problems associated
with the implementation of those provisions. The Article highlights the con-
tinual struggle between the legitimate enforcement goals of the new regula-
tory regime enacted by the 1990 Amendments and the traditional due
process rights of persons regulated by the Act.
A. The Consequences of Non-compliance
Under the 1990 Amendments, significantly stiffer penalties may be im-
posed against persons who fail to comply with the Act's provisions. The
EPA (or a delegated state program) has three alternative approaches for en-
forcing the regulatory requirements of the Act. First, the EPA can assess
administrative penalties of up to $25,000 per day, per violation, with a ceil-
ing of $200,000 for a particular violation.27 The EPA and the Department
of Justice can raise this ceiling if they jointly determine that the $200,000
limit should be exceeded in a particular case.28 In the administrative en-
forcement area, the EPA also may issue field citations with fines of up to
$5,000 per day for minor violations including violations of record-keeping
and reporting requirements. 29
Second, the EPA has the authority to institute a civil judicial enforcement
action against an alleged violator. In this court action, the EPA may seek a
temporary or permanent injunction, or a civil penalty of up to $25,000 per
day for each violation, or both.30
Finally, the EPA can petition the Department of Justice to initiate a crim-
inal enforcement action. 31 The 1990 Amendments have significantly ex-
tended the possible criminal sanctions. For example, any person who
negligently releases a hazardous air pollutant or extremely hazardous sub-
stance into the air and thereby places another person in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury is subject to criminal liability, including incar-
23. Id. § 7413(c).
24. Id. § 7413(b)-(c).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7414(a).
26. Id. § 7413(f).
27. Id. § 7413(d).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 7413(d)(3).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(b).
31. Id. § 7413(a)(3)(D).
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ceration. 32 More severe criminal sanctions apply in cases where a person
knowingly releases such pollutants.33 Furthermore, the 1990 Amendments
expand the list of Clean Air Act violations that make a convicted person
ineligible for federal contracts, grants, or loans and allow the EPA to extend
the prohibition to other facilities owned or operated by the convicted
person.34
1. Criminal Liability Under the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act
a. The General Provisions
When the Clean Air Act first became law, criminal prosecution for even
the most egregious environmental offenses was relatively rare. 35 The regula-
tory enforcement climate, however, has changed drastically over the last
twenty-one years since the original passage of the Clean Air Act and the
public pressure to expand liability for environmental offenses has increased
accordingly. To deal with such violations, the federal government has cre-
ated a distinct unit of the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute
environmental violators.36 Congress also has amended most major environ-
mental statutes to incorporate stringent criminal penalties for those parties
acting in violation of the statutory mandates 37 and the new Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines applicable to individual defendants impose significant prison
terms on parties convicted of environmental crimes.38 These increased pen-
32. Id. § 7413(c)(4).
33. Id. § 7413(c)(5).
34. Id. § 7606(a).
35. See Frederick W. Addison, III & Elizabeth E. Mack, Creating an Environmental
Ethic In Corporate America: The Big Stick of Jail Time, 44 Sw. L.J. 1427 (1991); Note, Devel-
opments in the Law - Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal
Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1335 (1979).
36. The Environmental Crimes Unit (ECU) was organized at the Department of Justice
in 1982 with the specific purpose of investigating and prosecuting parties committing environ-
mental offenses. See Judson W. Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 379 (1986). In his 1991 keynote address at the Department of Justice Environ-
mental Law Enforcement Conference, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh noted that since
the establishment of the ECU in 1982, federal prosecutors have returned a total of 761 indict-
ments that resulted in 549 convictions. Richard Thornburgh, Our Blue Planet: A Law En-
forcement Challenge, Keynote Address at the 1991 Department of Justice Environmental Law
Conference, New Orleans, La. (Jan. 8, 1991) These convictions resulted in the assessment of
$57 million in penalties, restitutions, and forfeitures and the imposition of 348 years of jail
time. Id. at 5. The conviction rate in federal criminal prosecutions for environmental offenses
has reached a staggering 95% under this prosecutorial scheme, with 55% of those convicted
receiving a prison sentence. Id; see Mary E. Kris & Gail L. Vannelli, Today's Criminal Envi-
ronmental Enforcement Program - Why You May Be Vulnerable and Why You Should Guard
Against Prosecution Through An Environmental Audit, COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. (forthcoming
1991).
37. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c) (West Supp.
1991) (requiring sentences ranging from not more than 1 year to 15 years imprisonment for the
most egregious Clean Air Act violations); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988)
(prescribing a 15-year sentence and/or $250,000 fine for individuals or $1,000,000 fine for
corporations knowingly endangering other parties under the Clean Water Act); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (imposing up to three years imprisonment and/or a $250,000 fine
for parties knowingly discharging waste in violation of the Clean Water Act).
38. United States Sentencing Comm'n, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2Q1.1-2Q2.1 (1991) [hereinafter FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL]. Further-
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alties are an expression of a strong public policy refusing to tolerate the ac-
tions of persons who seek to impose an unwarranted environmental burden
on society. 39
The criminalization of environmental statutes is nowhere better displayed
than in the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. The 1990 Amendments
institute a major reform in the criminal penalties applicable to violations of
the Act, increase the length of prison terms that can be imposed for viola-
tions of the Act's provisions, and even incorporate criminal penalties for
certain paperwork violations.4° The most severe criminal sanctions, how-
ever, are reserved, understandably, for parties committing knowing viola-
tions of the Act that endanger the life and health of other individuals.41
Under the 1990 Amendments, a person may be imprisoned for up to two
years, fined, 42 or both, if that individual engages in any of the following
conduct: knowingly makes a false material statement, representation, or cer-
tification in, or omits information from, or knowingly alters, conceals, or
fails to file or maintain any required notice, application, record, report, plan,
or other document that the person is required to file or maintain; 43 fails to
notify or report as required by the Act;44 or falsifies, tampers with, renders
inaccurate, or fails to install any monitoring device or method the Act re-
quires maintained or followed. 45 The penalties may be doubled if the of-
fender has previously been convicted of another offense under this section.
46
Previous to the 1990 Amendments, any person convicted of the same offense
could be imprisoned for a period of not more than six months, or fined
$10,000, or both.47 The 1990 Amendments also impose a possible prison
more, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have extinguished the right to parole to ensure that
the sentence imposed is the sentence an offender will serve. See Judson W. Starr & Thomas J.
Kelly, Jr., Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing Guidelines: The Time Has Come .. and It
Is Hard Time, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 10,100 (March 1990); see also Kris &
Vannelli, supra note 36, at 7-8. The Sentencing Guidelines also place severe limitations on the
availability of probation for individual defendants, which had been the norm for those con-
victed of environmental offenses. FEDERAL. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra,
§ 5B 1.1 (probation only authorized if minimum term of imprisonment under sentencing table
ranges from zero to six months).
39. A perfect example of this new approach is evident in a statement made by Richard B.
Stewart, Assistant Attorney General for the Environmental and Natural Resources Division of
the Department of Justice, when he said: "Those who would seek to illegally profit from the
environmental consciousness of our citizens are warned - the risk you create for the environ-
ment will be matched by the risk you face of jail." Justice Department Files Criminal Charges
Against Pollution Testing Firm and Its President, Bus. WIRE, Aug. 28, 1990.
40. See supra note 31-34 and accompanying text.
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
42. The fines that may be assessed for such violations are determined in accordance with
Title 18 of the United States Code. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571-3574 (1988).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(2)(A).
44. Id. § 7413(c)(2)(B).
45. Id. § 7413(c)(2)(C).
46. Id. § 7413(c)(2).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (1988). Under the old scheme, such offenders usually received
probation as the result of a criminal prosecution for these types of offenses. The increased
criminal penalties incorporated by the 1990 Amendments have foreclosed the availability of
probation for offenders under these provisions because of the new restrictions placed upon that
program by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
probation is authorized only if the minimum term of imprisonment under the sentencing table
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term of not more than one year for a person who knowingly fails to pay a fee
owed to the federal government under the Act.48 Prior to the enactment of
the 1990 Amendments, such a violation was not subject to a criminal
penalty.
Congress also increased criminal penalties for other violations. The 1990
Amendments provide a prison term of not more than five years and/or a fine
for persons knowingly violating any provision of: an implementation plan,49
the new source performance standards,50 the section relating to solid waste
combustion,5' the section relating to preconstruction requirements,5 2 the
section relating to emergency orders,53 the sections relating to permits, 5 4 or
any requirement or prohibition in the sections relating to stratospheric ozone
control,55 including a requirement of any rule, order, waiver, or permit
promulgated or approved under those sections. The prior version of the Act
punished similar activities by imposing a jail term of not more than one year
and a fine of not more than $25,000 per day for first time offenders (with
both penalties doubled upon a second conviction).56 Under the new criminal
penalties incorporated by the 1990 Amendments, criminal sanctions are im-
posed even where the violators do not possess the conventional mens rea
requirement for criminal liability. A person who negligently releases a de-
fined hazardous pollutant5 7 or extremely hazardous substances58 into the
ambient air and thereby places another person in imminent danger of death
or serious bodily injury is now punishable, if convicted, by up to one year
imprisonment and/or a fine.5 9
Persons who knowingly release defined hazardous substances into the am-
bient air and place others in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury are to be punished by imprisonment for not more than fifteen years
and/or a fine.6° If the "person" convicted of the knowing violation is an
organization, a fine of up to $1,000,000 for each violation may be imposed. 61
To establish such violations, the law does not require an actual, knowing
participation in or authorization of the alleged offenses by those charged.
ranges from zero to six months. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note
38, § 5B1.1.
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(3) (West Supp. 1991).
49. Id. § 7413(c)(1).
50. Id. § 7411 (e).
51. Id. § 7429.
52. Id. § 7477.
53. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7603.
54. Id. §§ 7661-7661a.
55. Id. §§ 7671-7671q.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (1988).
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(4) (West Supp. 1991); see id. § 7412 (defining "hazardous
pollutant").
58. Id. § 7413(c)(4); see id. § 11002(a)(2) (directing the Administrator to publish a list of
extremely hazardous substances).
59. Id. § 7413(c)(4). The fine is assessed under Title 18 of the United States Code. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 3571, 3574 (1988).
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(5)(A).
61. Id. Such fines are assessed under Title 18 of the United States Code. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3571, 3574.
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Any "person" who commits an alleged violation, including corporate officers
merely acting in a supervisory capacity are subject to criminal liability. 62
The introduction of circumstantial evidence, including proof that the de-
fendant took affirmative steps to be shielded from relevant information con-
cerning the charged violations may establish proof of the requisite intent.63
b. Criminal Liability and the Responsible Corporate Officer
The criminal provisions of the 1990 Amendments apply to any person
who commits an enumerated offense. 64 The definition of person was
amended in 1990 to include "any responsible corporate officer."165 Congress
clearly intended criminal sanctions to be levied against corporate officials
who are responsible for overseeing the actions of environmental personnel.66
The Department of Justice has adopted this scheme by promoting the identi-
fication, prosecution, and conviction of the "highest-ranking, truly responsi-
ble corporate officials." '67
The seminal case establishing liability for corporate officers under the "re-
sponsible corporate officer" doctrine was United States v. Dotterweich.68 In
Dotterweich the United States Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of a
pharmaceutical corporation and its president for violations of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.69 The corporate president's conviction was
affirmed even though he did not participate in the activities leading to the
charged violations nor did he have any knowledge of the unlawful conduct.70
The Court determined in Dotterweich that Congress did not intend for cor-
porate officials to be immune from criminal liability when their corporation
was charged with a criminal offense. 7 1 The Court determined that liability
should extend to all corporate officials who have some "responsibility" for
the unlawful actions.
[A] corporation may commit an offense and all persons who aid and
abet its commission are equally guilty. Whether an accused shares re-
sponsibility in the business process resulting in unlawful [conduct] de-
pends on the evidence produced at the trial. . . . The offense is
committed... by all who do have such a responsible share in the fur-
therance of the transaction which the statute outlaws. . . . Hardship
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(6). See Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1432.
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(5)(B).
64. The term person was defined originally under the Act as "an individual, corporation,
partnership, association, State, municipality, political subdivision of a State, and any agency,
department, or instrumentality of the United States and any officer, agent, or employee
thereof." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1988).
65. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(6) (West Supp. 1991).
66. Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1432.
67. F. Henry Habicht, II, The Federal Perspective on Environment Enforcement: How to
Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), at 10,480 (Dec. 1987); see also
Kris & Vannelli, supra note 36, at 17-18.
68. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
69. Id. at 278 (the defendants were convicted for introducing or delivering for introduc-
tion into interstate commerce adulterated or misbranded drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 281-85. The Court reasoned that "the only way in which a corporation can act
is through the individuals who act on its behalf." Id.
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there doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the trans-
action though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting.
72
The Court discussed the principles enumerated in Dotterweich more re-
cently in United States v. Park.73 In Park the Court set forth the applicable
standards for determining if a responsible corporate officer is criminally lia-
ble for the alleged statutory violation. 74 The Court held in Park that a cor-
porate officer or other person was criminally liable if that person, by reason
of his position in the corporation, had the responsibility and authority either
to initially prevent or promptly correct the unlawful act, and that the party
failed to meet its duty.75
The First Circuit, in United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil
Co. ,76 recently applied the standards established in Park to limit the applica-
bility of the responsible corporate officer doctrine under statutes containing a
scienter requirement. The court held that knowledge could not be inferred
to find a corporate officer culpable solely due to that officer's position in a
corporation. 77 Consequently, courts may require prosecutors to establish a
corporate official's knowledge of the illegal activities through direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence to prove liability under statutes containing a mens rea
requirement, depending on the specific language of the statute involved.
Courts are applying the responsible corporate officer doctrine under a
number of statutes, including environmental laws.78 For example, the Third
Circuit; in United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.,79 applied the responsible
corporate officer doctrine to uphold the convictions of a plant supervisor and
service manager for violations of the permit requirements of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).80 The court held that the RCRA
penalty provisions applied to those responsible corporate officers because
"they knew or should have known that there had been no compliance with
the permit requirement. "81 The 1990 Amendments specifically incorporate
72. Id. at 284.
73. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
74. Id. at 673-74.
75. Id.
76. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
77. Id. at 55. According to the court: "In a crime having knowledge as an express ele-
ment, a mere showing of official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park is not an adequate
substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of knowledge." Id.
78. See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 (3rd Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985) (applying the responsible corporate officer doctrine to up-
hold convictions of corporate officials under the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act);
United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123, 1130 n. II (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1074 (1980) (upholding convictions of corporate officers under the Clean Water Act on the
basis of the responsible corporate officer doctrine); see also Alan Zarky, The Responsible Corpo-
rate Officer Doctrine, [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA), at 987 (Jan. 1, 1991) (dis-
cussing the growing trend of prosecuting corporations and corporate officers for environmental
crimes); Robert E. Cleaves, White-Collar Crimes: Engineering Trends in Corporate Criminal
Liability, 5 ME. B.J. 28, 33 (Jan. 1990) (observing the growing trend of courts applying the
responsible corporate officer doctrine to find criminal liability in the environmental area).
79. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
80. Id. at 664-65. RCRA is codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6922k (West 1983 & Supp.
1991).
81. Id. at 665 (emphasis added). But see United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 894-95
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the concept of the responsible corporate officer into the definition of persons
criminally liable for violations of the Clean Air Act.82 Corporate officers
and employees can be liable for actions taken on behalf of a corporation,
even though those parties may not have actively participated in the alleged
wrongdoing. Unless courts confine the responsible corporate officer doctrine
to cases brought under statutory provisions that do not require a showing of
willfulness or intent, corporate officers could face substantial terms of im-
prisonment simply because of their managerial status in a corporation.8 3
c. Criminal Sanctions When "Knowing" Conduct Is Required
Generally, when parties are prosecuted under statutes that mandate a
mens rea requirement for conviction, courts have required at least some min-
imal showing of knowledge or acquiescence to hold corporate officials crimi-
nally liable.84 At first glance, such a required showing appears to raise the
level of proof above that necessary to impose liability on the official under
the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine. This standard, however, does
not demand a showing that a corporate official has distinct knowledge. that
the actions taken were unlawful. Courts have reduced the burden on federal
prosecutors, requiring only that prosecutors establish the alleged offender's
conduct was voluntary and intentional and not accidental.8 5
A number of cases have applied this knowledge standard to convict per-
sons under environmental legislation. For example, the United States
Supreme Court, in United States v. International Minerals & Chemical
(E.D. Wash. 1991) (casting doubt on whether enforcement provisions of RCRA requiring
"knowing" conduct subject corporate officers to criminal liability under the "responsible cor-
porate officer" doctrine).
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(6) (West Supp. 1991).
83. See Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1435. But see MacDonald & Watson Waste
Oil, 933 F.2d at 55 (limiting the extent to which the responsible corporate officer doctrine may
be used to establish criminal liability under statutes requiring scienter); see also 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7413(c)(1), (2), (3), (5) (West Supp. 1991). Under the 1990 Amendments, a corporate officer
managing an operation may face criminal liability for the negligent release of a hazardous
pollutant into the ambient air that negligently threatens another person with imminent danger
of death or serious bodily harm. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(4). By providing for the prosecution
of negligent conduct under the Clean Air Act, Congress must have intended that the provi-
sions of the Act describing liability for "knowing" conduct require a demonstration of actual
knowledge, direct participation, or a willful refusal to act. See White, 766 F. Supp. at 894-95
(casting doubt on the determination that the provisions of RCRA that impose criminal liability
for what a party "should have known" are applicable to corporate officials under the "respon-
sible corporate officer" doctrine); Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1435 n.70.
84. See MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil, 933 F.2d at 55 (holding that in a statute contain-
ing an express knowledge requirement, the mere showing of an official's responsibility for cor-
porate actions is not an adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of knowledge);
Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1435. See generally John F. Seymour, Civil and Criminal
Liability of Corporate Officers Under Federal Environmental Laws, [Current Developments]
Env't Rep. (BNA), at 342 (June 9, 1989) (asserting that under most federal environmental
statutes the government must prove a corporate officer acted deliberately and had the requisite
intent or knowledge to be held liable for the conduct of a subordinate).
85. See Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1435; see also McGovern, et al., Criminal




Corp.,86 determined that federal prosecutors were not required to establish
that a defendant possessed knowledge of the applicable federal regulations to
secure a criminal conviction under the Interstate Commerce Commission
regulations controlling the transportation of hazardous waste.87 The Court
held that prosecutors needed to prove only that the defendant possessed
knowledge that the materials being transported were a defined hazardous
waste.88 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, asserted that where the
process under scrutiny concerns the handling of "dangerous or deleterious
devices or products or obnoxious waste materials," 89 the certainty of regula-
tion is so evident that any party dealing with those substances must be pre-
sumed to have knowledge of the regulation.90
International Minerals exemplifies the standard of proof required in fed-
eral prosecutions under environmental statutes requiring scienter on the part
of an offender. Federal courts do not require proof that a defendant pos-
sesses knowledge that its actions are illegal. The courts only require a show-
ing that the defendant took intentional, voluntary actions in an area under
obvious regulatory control. 9'
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Hayes International Corp. ,92 ap-
plied the principles established by International Minerals in evaluating the
knowledge required to sustain a criminal conviction under RCRA. The
Hayes court determined that prosecutors were not required to prove a de-
fendant's actual knowledge of the illegality of its conduct.93 In Hayes the
owner and an employee of an airplane repair operation were charged with
violating RCRA provisions prohibiting the knowing transportation of haz-
ardous waste to a disposal facility that lacked a required operating permit.
The court upheld the conviction of the defendants even though both parties
claimed not to have known their actions were illegal.94 The court deter-
mined that prosecutors were only required to establish that the defendants
knew or should have known that the disposal facility to which the waste was
transported lacked a required permit. 95 The court asserted that the govern-
ment could satisfy its proof burden by establishing knowledge through cir-
cumstantial evidence. 96 Additionally, the court held that the prosecutors
sustained their burden by establishing that the waste disposal contract was
obtained for an unusually low price that should have prompted the defend-
ants to further investigate the permit status of the disposal facility. 97
86. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
87. Id. at 563.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 565.
90. Id.
91. 402 U.S. at 564-65.
92. 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
93. Id. at 1503, 1505.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court stated, "a defendant acts knowingly if he willfully fails to determine the
permit status of the facility." Id. at 1504.
96. Id.
97. 786 F.2d at 1504.
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Other courts have applied the constructive knowledge standard espoused
in Hayes to uphold findings of requisite criminal intent.98 In United States v.
Cart99 the Second Circuit broadened the scope of the constructive knowl-
edge to incorporate criminal culpability for even low ranking employees if
those parties were "in a position to detect, prevent, and abate a release of
hazardous substances." l o0 Cart has sanctioned, in essence, the imposition of
knowing criminal liability upon lower level employees that exercise some
supervisory control over the corporate actions giving rise to an alleged
violation. 101
Although courts and commentators have attempted to distinguish the
proof burden resting on the government in prosecuting defendants under
environmental statutes containing scienter requirements from the
prosecutorial burden under general regulatory statutes, no measurable evi-
dentiary distinction exists. Both types of cases establish criminal liability for
corporate officials who, based on their position, knew or should have known
of the alleged activities giving rise to the violation.' 0 2 Furthermore, this
proof burden has been lessened substantially because circumstantial evidence
may establish the requisite intent. Consequently, even though an environ-
mental statute may provide a scienter requirement, corporate employees face
criminal sanctions for reckless or negligent decisions and actions, including
the failure to perform the proper regulatory review. 103
Many of the newly enacted statutory prohibitions under the 1990 Amend-
ments require knowing violations before criminal liability is imposed.' ° 4 If
the analysis in Johnson & Towers, Hayes, and Cart applies to criminal prose-
cutions initiated under those sections, however, the government's proof bur-
den to establish the liability of corporate officials is greatly diminished. 0 5
Corporate officials in supervisory positions, who do not possess actual
knowledge and have remained somewhat removed from the environmental
98. See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 669-70 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985) (holding that the knowledge requirement for certain RCRA
violations could be established under a constructive knowledge standard inferred from circum-
stantial evidence); see also Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1435-38 (discussing cases setting
forth the knowledge requirement for violations of environmental regulations).
99. 880 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir. 1989).
100. Id. at 1554.
101. The 1990 Amendments explicitly declare that lower level employees may be held
criminally liable for their knowing violations of the Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(h)
(West Supp. 1991) (stating that "[eJxcept in the case of knowing and willful violations.... the
term 'a person' shall not include an employee who is carrying out his normal activities and
who is not a part of senior management personnel or a corporate officer" and "[eJxcept in the
case of knowing and willful violations .... the term 'a person' shall not include an employee
who is carrying out his normal activities and who is acting under orders from the employer.")
(emphasis added).
102. Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1438.
103. Id.; see also Stanley S. Arkin, Crime Against the Environment, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9, 1990,
at 3.
104. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(l)-(3), (5) (West Supp. 1991).
105. The 1990 Amendments themselves incorporate the reduced proof burden for estab-
lishing criminal liability by expressly permitting the proof of requisite "knowledge" by circum-
stantial evidence, including "evidence that the defendant took affirmative steps to be shielded
from relevant information." Id. § 7413(c)(5)(B).
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activities of the corporation, are no longer safe from prosecution under the
Clean Air Act.' °6 These officials are required to assert stricter, more in-
formed control over a company's daily operations, ensuring compliance with
all regulatory requirements and carefully documenting any preventive or
corrective actions taken.
d. Prosecuting Parties Under the Clean Air Act
Increasingly, regulatory agencies are seeking to prosecute high corporate
officials in an attempt to deter environmental crimes by establishing guide-
lines to structure their criminal prosecutions. For example, the EPA has
formulated a series of considerations to determine whether the agency will
invoke criminal sanctions. The agency's criteria include: (1) the existence of
proof of the required criminal intent (where necessary), (2) the nature and
seriousness of the offense, (3) the deterrent effect of the prosecution, (4) the
subject's history of compliance, and (5) whether an alternative remedy
would be more practicable.107 Through the implementation of these stan-
dards the EPA stresses its primary objective - deterrence of future
violations. 108
Once the EPA designates a case as prime for prosecution, the agency re-
fers the case to the Department of Justice (DOJ). In all federal criminal
actions, the final decision of whether to pursue a conviction rests with the
DOJ. 109 The determination by the DOJ of whether to seek an indictment
does not hinge simply on whether an indictment can be obtained, but focuses
instead on whether a felony conviction is the probable case outcome.1 0 As
a result, the conviction rate in environmental criminal prosecutions is ap-
proaching ninety-five percent."'
In conjunction with the prosecutorial guidelines promulgated by the EPA,
the DOJ has formulated the following list of factors that should be consid-
ered to determine if a criminal indictment is warranted: (1) federal law en-
forcement priorities, (2) the nature and seriousness of the charged offense,
(3) the deterrent effect of the prosecution, (4) the person's culpability in con-
nection with the offense, (5) the person's history with respect to criminal
106. Many legal commentators assert that cases such as Hayes, Carr, and Johnson & Tow-
ers have initiated the demise of basic constitutional protections in the realm of environmental
regulation. See Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1438 n.99; Arkin, supra note 103, at 3;
Daniel Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental Wrongs, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.), at 10,065 (Mar. 1985); Jonathan Weber, Corporate Crime of the '90s: Prosecu-
tors Are Aiming for the Boardroom in a Growing Push Against Polluters, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25,
1989, at 1.
107. Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1439. See also Robert J. Kafin & Gail Port,
Environmental Enforcement.: Criminal Sanctions Lead to Higher Fines and Jail, NAT'L L. J.,
July 23, 1990, at 20 (citing Memorandum from Robert M. Perry, Associate Administrator of
the EPA, to Regional Counsels, Criminal Enforcement Priorities for the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (Oct. 12, 1982)).
108. See Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1439; see also Kafin & Port, supra note 107, at
21.
109. Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1438.
110. Id.
111. Thornburgh, supra note 36, at 5 (in 1990, the conviction rate was 95%, with 55% of
the individuals convicted receiving prison sentences).
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activity, (6) the person's willingness to cooperate in the investigation, and (7)
the probable sentence or other consequence if the person is convicted.' 12
The decision to prosecute also involves a consideration of whether the
alleged violation detracts from the regulatory process." 3 Both the DOJ and
the EPA are more likely to seek an indictment for those alleged violations
that diminish the integrity of an industry's reporting system. Offenses that
involve the falsification of documents or other disingenuous reporting proce-
dures also provide the federal government with a specific incentive to prose-
cute and secure a conviction.'14
The federal government has announced its intention to utilize an active
prosecutorial agenda to enforce environmental standards and to deter future
misconduct. 1 5 Through the introduction of extensive criminal enforcement
provisions into the Clean Air Act, the 1990 Amendments provide federal
prosecutors with sufficient ammunition to pursue environmental offenders
holding high-ranking positions in the corporate hierarchy. The emerging
prosecutorial policy of the federal government focuses the burden of crimi-
nal liability on these "responsible" corporate officers in an attempt to deter
future corporate environmental offenses.
B. Return of the Bounty Hunter
In the faithful tradition of the Old West, many statutes are reincarnating
the bounty hunter. The amended Clean Air Act is no exception. The 1990
Amendments allow the Administrator to "pay an award, not to exceed
$10,000, to any person who furnishes information or services which lead to a
criminal conviction or a judicial or administrative civil penalty for any viola-
tion" of the Act or for any other statutory requirements enforced under the
Act." 6 In addition, the Administrator has the power to "prescribe addi-
tional criteria for eligibility for such an award" through regulation." 17
Although the regulations pertaining to the awards provision of the 1990
Amendments are not required to be promulgated until 1992, 118 the Compli-
ance Monitoring Branch of EPA's Stationary Source Compliance Division
has begun to formulate policy concerning the implementation of the pro-
112. United States Dep't of Justice, PRINCIPALS OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION (1980), cited
in Seymour, supra note 84, at 343.
113. Kafin & Port, supra note 107, at 20.
114. Id. See Habicht, supra note 67, at 10,481 ("Actions to conceal or to mislead the
government, along with a substantive violation of pollution laws, will virtually guarantee fel-
ony indictment and conviction .... ").
115. "Effectively preying on corporate America's fear of incarceration and the associated
stigma, including, in most cases, the complete destruction of an individual's professional ca-
reer, the EPA and the Department of Justice seek to weed out environmental offenders and
deter future degradation of the environment." Addison & Mack, supra note 35, at 1440 (cita-
tions omitted).
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(f) (West Supp. 1991).
117. Id.
118. Telephone Interview with Mamie Miller, Chief of the Compliance Monitoring Branch
of the Stationary Source Compliance Division (July 15, 1991). Ms. Miller is listed as the EPA
contact for information on the Clean Air Act award provision. 56 Fed. Reg. 18,035 (1991).
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gram. "19 The regulations are expected to track those issued under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) award program 120 and certain Fish and Wildlife award pro-
grams 12 1 administered under the guidance of the Fish and Wildlife Enforce-
ment Policy Manual.122
There are two major differences between the CERCLA award program
and the Fish and Wildlife programs. First, the CERCLA program allows
individuals to submit claims directly, 12 3 while the Fish and Wildlife pro-
grams only recognize claims submitted at the recommendation of an
agent. 124 Second, CERCLA only offers awards for information leading to a
criminal conviction of a party violating specific provisions of CERCLA, 125
while the Fish and Wildlife programs offer awards for information serving as
the basis for a civil, criminal, or administrative penalty against an
offender. 126
The CERCLA regulations also contain certain additional limitations for
those parties submitting an award claim. The CERCLA program offers
awards only for information that leads to the criminal conviction of parties
who either failed to give required notice of a release of a reportable quantity
of a hazardous substance 127 or who destroyed or concealed records required
to be maintained under CERCLA. 128 Under the regulations, corporations
or associations, law enforcement officers, persons convicted in the case giv-
ing rise to the award claim, or persons who obtained the information dis-
closed to the EPA while employed by the EPA or who are so employed at
the time of disclosure cannot claim awards.' 29 Eligibility for an award
under the CERCLA program requires the claimant to disclose the identity
of the person or persons (or provide information that leads to the disclosure
of the person or persons) criminally culpable for the alleged violations. The
disclosure of information must be made to an agent, representative, or em-
ployee of the EPA.130 An award claim must be filed within forty-five days
after the conviction of the person or persons about whom information was
119. Telephone Interview with Clara Poffenberger, Staff, Compliance Monitoring Branch
of the Stationary Source Compliance Division (July 15, 1991).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9609(d) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 303 (1990).
121. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(d) (1988); Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3375(d)
(1988).
122. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., Div. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, LAW ENFORCEMENT POL-
ICY MANUAL (1990).
123. See 40 C.F.R. § 303 (1990) (CERCLA regulations allowing any "individual" to make
a claim).
124. See UNITED STATES DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM,
Deposit of Civil Penalty Payments, Fines, and Proceeds of Forfeited Property Sales Into, and
Payment of Rewards From, the Law Enforcement Reward Account, File No. FIS 1-002570, No.
LE-1 18 (issued Sept. 18, 1984) [hereinafter LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM].
125. See 40 C.F.R. § 303.10-303.12 (1990).
126. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1540(d), 3375(d) (1988).
127. 40 C.F.R. § 303.12(a) (1990) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a)).
128. Id. § 303.12(b) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9603(d)).
129. Id. § 303.20(a)-(b).
130. Id. § 303.20(c).
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provided.13 1 All such claim submissions then should be transmitted to the
EPA's Office of Criminal Enforcement Counsel. 132 The EPA's determina-
tions of an individual's eligibility and award amount constitute final agency
action, subject to a corresponding right of administrative and judicial review
for any party with a claim to the award. 133
The Fish and Wildlife Service's award programs differ from the CERCLA
program. Fish and Wildlife Service rewards are payable to individuals fur-
nishing information leading to an arrest, criminal conviction, civil penalty
assessment, or forfeiture of property for the associated violation.134 Award
requests must be submitted by the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the
investigation on behalf of the individual making the claim. 135 Each reward
payment request must be submitted in a specific, described format and must
be signed by the Assistant Regional Director for Law Enforcement. 136 Pay-
ment of an award to any official of a foreign government or any employee of
the federal, state, or local government, any member of the immediate family
of such an official, or any person for whom the payment of such a reward
would create a conflict of interest or give the appearance of impropriety is
prohibited. 137
131. Id. § 303.33(a).
132. 40 C.F.R. § 303.33(c) (1990). In determining whether to grant a submitted award
claim under the CERCLA program, the EPA must consider all relevant criteria including:
(a) Whether the claimant's information constituted the initial, unsolicited
notice to the Government of the violation;
(b) Whether the Government would readily have obtained knowledge of the
violation in a timely manner absent claimant's information;
(c) Importance of the case, egregiousness of the violation, potential for or
existence of environmental harm;
(d) Concealment of a person criminally culpable or existence of an organ-
ized criminal conspiracy to conceal the offense(s) committed by the named de-
fendant(s);
(e) Willingness of the claimant to assist the Government's prosecution of the
offense(s), which assistance includes providing further information and grand
jury testimony, participation in the trial preparation, and trial testimony if con-
sistent with the limits [established to protect against disclosure of a claimant's
identity where necessary] ....
(f) Value of the claimant's assistance in comparison to that given by all
other sources of information and evidence which led to [the defendant's] arrest
and conviction.
Id. § 303.30.
133. Id. § 303.21.
134. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(d) (1988) (Lacey Act award provision); 16 U.S.C. § 3375(d)
(1988) (Endangered Species Act award provision).
135. See LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 124, at 1.
136. FIsH & WILDLIFE SERV., Div. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, LAW ENFORCEMENT POL-
ICY MANUAL, § 6.8(A) (1990).
137. Id. § 6.8(B) (1990). The information required within a reward request under the Fish
and Wildlife Service's programs includes:
(1) The name, address, occupation, and employer of the individual for whom
the reward is requested.
(2) The permanent informant identification number if one has been assigned.
(3) The case number and the title of the case for which the reward is
requested.
(4) The amount of reward requested, including an explanation of how the
amount requested was derived.
(5) A statement of justification that must at a minimum include:
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The 1990 Amendments incorporate a "bounty hunter" provision into the
Clean Air Act similar to the provisions in the Endangered Species Act 138
and the Lacey Act 139 administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service. The
Clean Air Act's bounty hunter provision allows individuals to seek awards
for information or services leading to a criminal conviction or a judicial or
administrative civil penalty for any violation under the Act. The new provi-
sion also excludes any state or federal officer from eligibility for an award if
that person furnishes information or services in the performance of an offi-
cial duty.140 The regulations promulgated to implement the award program
require that an EPA agent submit claims and that they contain specific, de-
tailed information regarding the claimant's actions that allegedly warrant
issuance of a monetary award. 14 1 The information required is similar to the
(a) A summary of the investigations [and] a specific description of the
individual's involvement in that investigation.
(b) The number of subjects involved.
(c) The number of subjects against whom charges were filed, the nature
of those charges, and the results of any prosecutions.
(d) The total fines, jail, civil penalties, and forfeiture of property ob-
tained in the case.
(e) If all prosecutions have not been completed, a statement of why the
reward should be paid prior to completion of such prosecutions and
a statement that the prosecution attorney has been advised of the
request for reward and concurs with paying a reward while the
prosecution is still pending.
(f) If the individual for whom the reward is requested is known to have
now or has ever had any relationship, other than the involvement in
the investigation [detailed to the extent described to establish how
the information was obtained], with any Special Agent of the [Fish
and Wildlife] Service, with any family member of any Special Agent
or with any other person involved in the investigation or family
member of such person, the details of that relationship must be
provided.
(g) The total amount of compensation the individual has already re-
ceived for assistance in the case, and the total amount of compensa-
tion the individual has been paid within the last fiscal year for any
case.
(h) The name to whom the check is to be issued.
Id. § 6.8(C). Additional information to support the requested reward might include:
The significance to the resource of the case(s) that was furthered by the infor-
mation provided.
The risk, if any, to the individual of collecting the information provided.
The probability that the investigation would have been successfully con-
cluded/prosecuted without the information provided.
The relationship, if any, between the success of prosecution (fines, penalties,
and sentences awarded) and the information provided.
- The degree of cooperation exhibited by the individual who provided the information
(use of personal contacts to further the investigation).
LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 124, at 1.
138. 16 U.S.C. § 9609(d) (1988).
139. 16 U.S.C. § 3375(d) (1988).
140. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(f) (West Supp. 1991).
141. The staff at the Compliance Monitoring Branch of the Stationary Source Compliance
Division of the EPA responsible for formulating the regulations that will control the Clean Air
Act award program asserts that the general information required in an award request will be
the same as that required under the CERCLA program or those systems orchestrated by the
Fish and Wildlife Service. Telephone Interview with Clara Poffenberger, Staff, Compliance
Monitoring Branch of the Stationary Source Compliance Division (July 15, 1991). The staff
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material required under both the CERCLA program and the award pro-
grams regulated by the Fish and Wildlife Service.142
C. Affirmative Monitoring Requirements
The 1990 Amendments allow the EPA to require sources to monitor emis-
sions levels and to certify compliance with specific emissions limitations. A
person who fails either to perform the required monitoring or report accu-
rately the results of any tests may be subject to administrative penalties, a
civil enforcement action, and even criminal sanctions.143 In addition to the
obvious expense and effort necessary to comply with the reporting require-
ments, it is important to consider the effect these mandatory disclosures will
have in any prospective administrative or judicial action. Affirmative report-
ing requirements compel parties to disclose to the EPA any non-complying
conduct. The EPA then may take the self-reported information and institute
some action against the reporting party for the non-complying conduct dis-
closed. Furthermore, in any prospective administrative or civil action, the
party may find it has waived certain discovery privileges by having disclosed
the information.
Under the Clean Air Act, most records, reports, or information provided
to the EPA pursuant to mandatory monitoring requirements become agency
documents subject to public disclosure.'" An exception is made for records,
reports, or information provided to the Administrator that would, if made
public, divulge trade secrets of the responding party. The party seeking con-
fidentiality for disclosed information must make a satisfactory showing to
the EPA Administrator that the information deserves the requested
protection. 145
The 1990 Amendments expand the scope of the reporting requirements
under the Clean Air Act. The 1990 Amendments allow the EPA to require
the owner or operator of a facility to sample emissions and make one-time,
periodic, or continuous records or reports certifying the compliance status of
the emissions source. 146 Such certifications include: "(A) identification of
the applicable requirement that is the basis of the certification, (B) the
method used for determining the compliance status of the source, (C) the
compliance status, (D) whether compliance is continuous or intermittent,
[and] (E) such other facts as the Administrator may require." 147
Under these disclosure requirements, a person is compelled to submit to
also reports that an agent of the Division will be required to submit an award request on behalf
of a claimant and that no requests from individuals will be entertained unless so sponsored. Id.
142. Id.
143. Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(a)(3), the Administrator may issue an administrative pen-
alty, issue a compliance order, initiate a civil enforcement action, or request the Attorney
General to commence a criminal action against a party that fails to abide by any monitoring
requirements. Parties that do not report as required are subject to criminal penalties, including
substantial fines and jail time. See id. § 7413(c).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1988).
145. Id.
146. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7414(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
147. Id. § 7414(a)(3).
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the EPA information that would serve as the basis for an agency enforce-
ment action, an assessment of administrative penalties, or even a criminal
prosecution. The disclosure of the required information could also provide
individual citizens with the necessary data to institute citizen suits or toxic
tort actions.
A person statutorily required to make reports to the EPA is faced with a
perplexing problem. On the one hand, the party may desire to avoid discov-
ery of certain internal information concerning compliance activities which
could subject the party to significant claims by the government or the public.
On the other hand, a regulated entity and any of its officers or employees
want to comply completely and satisfactorily with the disclosure require-
ments to avoid administrative, civil, or criminal liability for a failure to
report.
1. Federal Privileges
Compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 1990 Amendments
may cause a person to waive privileges that initially would have protected
the disclosed information. In civil or criminal actions under the Clean Air
Act, federal law will control the extent to which the court will recognize any
privileges. 148 Such privileges are not applied by federal courts unless their
application promotes sufficiently important interests which outweigh the
general need for probative evidence. 149 The scope of any such asserted privi-
lege must be strictly construed. 150
a. The Fifth Amendment Privilege
Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, individu-
als have the right to refuse to disclose information that could incriminate
them.151 Corporations, associations, or other collective entities, however,
have no right to invoke the protection of the Fifth Amendment. 152 The
United States Supreme Court has held:
[ifl a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in
the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to em-
body or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constitu-
ents, but rather to embody their common or group interests only.., the
privilege [against self-incrimination] cannot be invoked on behalf of the
148. See In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261, 262 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the contours and
exceptions of privileges in nondiversity cases are a matter of federal common law and not state
law); see also United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
973 (1976) (finding that federal privilege law applies in criminal cases filed in federal court);
Urseth v. City of Dayton, 110 F.R.D. 245, 252-53 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (holding that federal law
controls the applicability of privileges where the basis of the court's jurisdiction was a federal
statute).
149. University of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).
150. Id.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
152. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 103 (1988). See also United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) (cited in (Under Seal) v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 732, 734
(E.D.N.Y. 1986)).
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organization or its representatives in their official capacity. 153
The past few years have seen a tremendous increase in the number of
prosecutions for environmental crimes, with the focus of the prosecutions
being high-ranking corporate officers. Generally, these corporate employees
seeking to avoid personal criminal liability will want to invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. However, the Fifth
Amendment does not appear to offer these officials protection from the Act's
statutory reporting requirements. 154
Corporate officials do not have a right to withhold required information or
documentation even if the disclosure could subject those parties to criminal
liability. 155 Under this rationale, a corporate officer has no Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against disclosure of information mandatorily maintained
pursuant to statute even if that information could implicate criminal wrong-
doing on the officer's part.1 56 Therefore, corporate officers cannot assert the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in an attempt to es-
cape the disclosure of records maintained under the requirements of the
amended Act.
It is critical to recognize that the restrictions on a corporate officer's Fifth
Amendment protection only extend to matters disclosed in the officer's offi-
cial capacity as a corporate representative. A corporate officer will still have
the right to Fifth Amendment protection in actions instituted against the
officer in a personal capacity. 57 While there are no environmental cases
that directly address the issue of self-incrimination, courts frequently have
addressed similar issues within the realm of the securities laws and the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. A number of cases have held that a party cannot resist
required disclosures under the protection of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege.158 The courts faced with interpreting the scope of statutory reporting
requirements outside the environmental area have held uniformly that the
statutory mandates do not implicate the Fifth Amendment. The protection
153. White, 322 U.S at 701.
154. In re 25 Grand Jury Subpoenas, 654 F. Supp. 647, 651-52 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding
that officers or custodians of a collective entity may not invoke a personal privilege so as to
avoid the production of documents on behalf of the collective entity).
155. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 590 (1946). The United States Supreme Court
explained: "The state requires the books be kept, but it does not require the officer to commit
the crime. If in the course of committing the crime he makes entries, the criminality of the
entries exists by his own choice and election, not by compulsion of law." Id. (quoting Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911)).
156. See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 380 (holding that a corporate officer has no Fifth Amendment
privilege to halt the disclosure of corporate records even though the records contain entries
made by the officer that disclose his criminal activity); see also United States v. Stirling, 571
F.2d 708, 728 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978) (finding that where an individ-
ual has chosen to engage in a lawful activity in an unlawful manner, the unlawfulness cannot
be used to excuse that party from regulatory disclosure requirements, even though such disclo-
sure could lead to criminal prosecution).
157. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 113.
158. See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1927) (holding that a party may
not refuse to file a tax return based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-




against self-incrimination does not apply even though the record-keeping re-
quirements may result in the disclosure of statutory violations that subject
the reporting party to a civil, administrative, or criminal penalty. 159
As early as 1948, in Shapiro v. United States, 160 the Supreme Court fash-
ioned an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion for required records. The Shapiro court determined that the privilege
protecting private papers cannot be extended to business records kept in ac-
cordance with law, where the transactions recorded are the appropriate sub-
ject of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions is validly
established. 161 This principle is known as the "required records" exception
to the Fifth Amendment. Under this exception, persons who are required by
law to maintain certain records have no claim to the Fifth Amendment pro-
tection against self-incrimination when the persons are required to produce
those records for review. 162 To come within the bounds of the required
records exception, documents must satisfy a three-pronged test: (1) the
mandate requiring the maintenance of the documents must be essentially
regulatory, (2) the maintained records must be the type of records customa-
rily kept by the regulated party, and (3) the records themselves must have
assumed "public aspects" which render them analogous to public
documents. 163
Documents maintained under the record-keeping requirements of the
Clean Air Act should satisfy the three prongs of the required records excep-
tion. First, the records the amended Act requires a regulated party to main-
tain obviously are kept as part of a mandatory regulatory scheme. 164
Second, the maintained records are the type of documents customarily kept
by such parties under a regulatory scheme. In addition, the reporting re-
quirements in the amended Clean Air Act are analogous to record-keeping
requirements in other environmental statutes. 165 Third, because the parties
assembling the required documents will know, or should know, that the
records are subject to review by the EPA, 166 those records will take on a
159. See Stirling, 571 F.2d at 727-28 (finding that the fact that the disclosure of the true
nature of a stock transaction to the Securities Exchange Commission could have formed the
basis of a criminal prosecution under the Taft-Hartley Act does not put the reporting require-
ments of the securities laws in conflict with the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Scherer,
523 F.2d 371, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976) (holding that the 1968
Gun Control Act does not implicate the Fifth Amendment even though record-keeping re-
quirements could result in the disclosure of any violations of the statute).
160. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
161. Id. at 17-20.
162. In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1191-92 (2d Cir. 1983).
163. Id. at 1191.
164. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (holding that the requirement
that drivers stop and report accidents in which they were involved is part of a regulatory
scheme); United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944
(1972) (holding that record-keeping requirements under 21 U.S.C. § 360a(d) pertaining to cer-
tain controlled substances are part of a regulatory scheme).
165. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
166. Documents or information disclosed to the EPA under the Clean Air Act generally
becomes subject to public disclosure. See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1988).
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public aspect. 167 Consequently, the records maintained under the mandates
of the amended Act may not receive Fifth Amendment protection.
b. State Privileges
In state court actions initiated by state agencies or by individuals against
an alleged environmental offender, and in federal diversity actions, 168 state
law will govern the possible applicability of any evidentiary privileges. Con-
sequently, in these types of cases, questions as to the right of regulated par-
ties to protect information disclosed under the amended Clean Air Act
would be controlled by state law.
(1) The Investigative Privileges
a. Anticipation of Litigation
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure recognize four specific investigative
privileges that a party may invoke to resist discovery. 169 All of these recog-
nized privileges, however, protect only materials that were created in antici-
pation of litigation (i.e., after the institution of a suit or after there was good
cause to believe a suit would be filed). 170 If an action has not been filed prior
to the time the materials were prepared, a party invoking one of the investi-
gative privileges must satisfy two criteria to establish that there was "good
cause" to believe an action would be commenced. 17 First, the person seek-
ing to withhold requested documents that were created prior to an action
must offer objective evidence that establishes there was good cause to believe
a suit would be filed. Second, the person must show that he had a subjective
167. In re Doe, 711 F.2d at 1192 (finding that because the parties compiling the required
documents possessed knowledge that the documents would be subject to review and public
disclosure, the third prong of the "required records" exception concerning the "public aspect"
of the records was satisfied).
168. In diversity actions, a federal district court is required to apply the law of privilege
that would be applied by the courts of the state in which the federal court sits. See In re
California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 892 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that in diversity
actions, questions of privilege are determined by state law); Samuelson v. Susen, 576 F.2d 546,
549-50 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that a federal district court should look to state privilege law in
diversity actions).
169. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b (the four privileges are in the areas of attorney work product,
party communications, witness statements, and non-testifying consulting experts).
170. Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 39-41 (Tex. 1989).
171. The Texas Supreme Court articulated the test as follows:
Determining whether there is good cause to believe a suit will be filed, so that an
investigation is done in anticipation of litigation, requires a two-prong analysis.
The first prong requires an objective examination of the facts surrounding the
investigation. Consideration should be given to outward manifestations which
indicate litigation is imminent. The second prong utilizes a subjective approach.
Did the party opposing discovery have a good faith belief that litigation would
ensue? There cannot be good cause to believe a suit will be filed unless elements
of both prongs are present. Looking at the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the investigation, the trial court must then determine if the investiga-
tion was done in anticipation of litigation. Unless there is an abuse of discretion,




good faith belief that a suit would be commenced.1 72
The mere fact that an accident has occurred or a party is not in compli-
ance with statutory regulations is not sufficient to establish good cause for
anticipation of a suit. Good cause to believe a suit will be filed requires some
outward manifestations of future litigation by the party having a cause of
action, not by the party trying to resist discovery. 173 The bare assertion of a
generic anticipation of litigation based upon patterns of prior injuries and
litigation is also insufficient to make the required showing, absent some out-
ward manifestations that a suit is imminent. 174 The requisite outward mani-
festations may consist of a party making a demand for damages, hiring an
attorney or private investigator, or commencing an investigation of the acci-
dent or occurrence.175
The Texas Supreme Court has held that the filing of a claim with an ad-
ministrative agency may not satisfy the anticipation of litigation standard
that is a requisite for protection of allegedly privileged investigative materi-
als.' 76 The court based its ruling on the fact that the action before the
agency was an uncontested hearing subject to de novo review. More re-
cently, however, a state court of appeals found that a claim filed with an
administrative agency, combined with other factors, could lead a trial judge
to conclude that relevant investigative materials are protected by privilege
because the materials were prepared in anticipation of litigation.' 77 Under
the mandatory reporting requirements of the Clean Air Act, however, the
reports compiled by regulated parties generally will not be privileged under
Texas law.178 Such reports are not created in anticipation of litigation, and
thus the information contained in those documents is likely to be subject to
public disclosure and not protected from discovery.' 7 9
D. Attorney-Client Privilege
The reporting and certification requirements of the 1990 Amendments
could work as a broad waiver of other evidentiary privileges. The attorney-
172. Boring & Tunneling Co. of America, Inc. v. Salazar, 782 S.W.2d. 284, 287 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ.).
173. Id.
174. Foster v. Heard, 757 S.W.2d 464, 465 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no
writ.).
175. Id. See also Child World v. Solito, 780 S.W.2d 954, 956-57 (Tex. App.-Houston
(14th Dist.] 1989, no writ.) (holding that a settlement demand letter that threatened the com-
mencement of litigation if the settlement offer was not accepted was sufficient to sustain the
"outward manifestation" requirement of the anticipation of litigation standard).
176. Flores, 777 S.W.2d at 39-40 (finding that a claim filed before the Industrial Accident
Board did not constitute "litigation" to protect materials prepared for hearing under an as-
serted investigative privilege because the hearing was uncontested and subject to de novo judi-
cial review).
177. American Home Assurance Co. v. Cooper, 786 S.W.2d 769, 771-72 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1990, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
178. Under 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1988), a party may petition the Administrator to withhold
certain reported information from public disclosure as confidential because that information
would divulge trade secrets of the regulated party.
179. Furthermore, the provisions of the Act specifically make such records subject to pub-
lic disclosure. See id.
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client privilege, which was created to promote full and frank client disclo-
sure, '80 is one such privilege which is probably affected. Under the attorney-
client privilege, communications from a client to an attorney are protected if
they are made in furtherance of legal representation, have an expectation of
confidentiality, and the privilege has not been waived. 181 The privilege also
protects any communication from an attorney to a client that is made in
furtherance of legal representation.1 82 Only the actual communications be-
tween attorney and client are protected and not the facts underlying those
communications.18 3 While the attorney-client privilege also applies when
the client is a corporation,' 8 4 the scope of the privilege in a corporate setting
is more limited. The corporate attorney-client privilege generally protects
communications made by corporate employees to corporate counsel if the
information is relayed at the direction of supervisory personnel, the informa-
tion conveyed relates to matters within the scope of the employees' duties,
and the employees know that they are cooperating in the investigation in
order to obtain legal advice for the corporation. i8 5
The attorney-client privilege may be waived voluntarily or inadver-
tently.186 Furthermore, the partial disclosure of a confidential communica-
tion may initiate a waiver as to the remainder of the communication, and as
to the subject matter of the communication.' 8 7 To constitute such a waiver,
180. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
181. The court in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.
Mass. 1950), formulated an oft-cited definition of the privilege:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (1) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
182. See In re LTV Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 602-03 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
183. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96.
184. Id. at 389-90.
185. Id. at 394-97. But see TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 503 and TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 503. In
Texas, the protection offered to a corporation under the attorney-client privilege may be more
limited than that recognized under federal law. The rules in Texas limit the attorney-client
privilege to protect only the communications between corporate counsel and corporate "repre-
sentatives" who have authority to obtain professional legal services on behalf of the corpora-
tion and to act on the legal advice secured. See TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 503(a)(2); TEX. R. CRIM.
EvID. 503(a)(2). The Texas Rules appear to exclude from the protection of the attorney-client
privilege communications between counsel and middle or lower level employees who have no
authority to hire counsel and who follow the instructions of administrative superiors, rather
than the advice of counsel.
186. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also 4 JAMES W.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.60 [2] (2d ed. 1991).
187. See Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir.
1981) (finding that the voluntary disclosure of the content of a privileged attorney communica-
tion constitutes waiver of the privilege as to all other such communications on the same sub-
ject); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161-62 (D.S.C. 1975)
(finding that waiver of attorney-client privilege applies to all communications on related sub-
ject matter, even if the initial waiver was made with express limitations); MOORE, supra note
186, at § 26.60 [2].
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however, the specific content of a privileged communication must be the sub-
ject of disclosure, not merely the underlying facts of that communication.'" s
A party's subjective intent is only one factor that courts focus on to deter-
mine if a waiver should be implied. 18 9 Furthermore, if communications be-
tween an attorney and client occur in connection with a continuing crime or
fraud, the attorney-client privilege does not protect those communications
made during or prior to the perpetration of the offense.' 90 The attorney's
lack of knowledge of the improper conduct does not affect the waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. 191
Generally, the voluntary disclosure of confidential information to the gov-
ernment acts as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.' 92 The filing of
statutorily required records or reports with the government may make those
documents subject to public disclosure thus waiving a claim of privilege.' 93
There are limited situations in which a litigant in a private action will not be
required to produce copies of documents filed with the government in ac-
cordance with statutory mandate. 94 The government also has the right to
assert a privilege against disclosure of the documents even though the pri-
vate litigant is willing to produce the materials to the opposing party. 195 In
188. Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454, 458 (N.D. Ill.
1974). See also International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 185-86
(M.D. Fla. 1973) (finding that the disclosure of facts underlying privileged communications
does not waive that privilege).
189. Weil, 647 F.2d at 24; Duplan Corp., 397 F. Supp. at 1162. But see United States v.
Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 44 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that a corporation's disclosure of a
report investigating its own alleged misconduct did not act as an implied waiver justifying
disclosure of the evidence underlying the report).
190. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979); Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); see also
MOORE, supra note 186, § 26.60 [2]. But see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 798
F.2d 32, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that confidential corporate documents created during
an on-going crime were still protected by the attorney-client privilege because the documents
did not facilitate or conceal the criminal activity).
191. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
680 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that lawyers' skills may not be employed, even
without their knowledge, in furthering crimes); MOORE, supra note 186, § 26.60 [2].
192. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 822-24 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that the volun-
tary disclosure of information to a government agency waives the attorney-client privilege);
Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the
disclosure of privileged information to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) waived the
attorney-client privilege as to that information); see also MOORE, supra note 186, § 26.60 [2]
n.31.
193. See Southern Film Extruders, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.R.D. 559, 561-62
(M.D.N.C. 1987) (holding that the preparation by attorneys of a party's proxy statement that
would be filed with the SEC manifests the lack of intention necessary to invoke the attorney-
client privilege to protect the information contained therein). However, there are certain stat-
utorily required reports that are protected from public disclosure as confidential. See Young v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 70 F. Supp 106, 108-09 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (holding that a registrant's
Selective Service file is privileged and in absence of waiver cannot be introduced into evidence
by the defendant in an action by the registrant); Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Holod, 30 F. Supp.
713, 713-14 (M.D. Pa. 1940) (holding that Selective Service records are protected from disclo-
sure as confidential information).
194. See Castellano v. Pennsylvania Reading Seashore Lines, 15 F.R.D. 276, 276 (E.D. Pa.
1953) (finding that reports filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission were protected
from disclosure); MOORE, supra note 186, § 26.61 [5.-2].
195. See Overby v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 158, 163 (5th Cir. 1955)
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most cases, however, a private litigant can be compelled to disclose such
documents. 196
The confidentiality of required reports, either under the attorney-client
privilege or any other asserted privilege, depends primarily on the statutory
language creating the affirmative reporting duty. The Supreme Court, in St.
Regis Paper Co. v. United States,197 specifically addressed the issue of
whether statutorily required reports can be protected from discovery as con-
fidential. In St. Regis Paper Co. the Federal Trade Commission directed a
regulated corporation to submit copies of its census reports to the Commis-
sion for review. The corporation refused to submit the reports based on a
claim of confidentiality. The Supreme Court rejected the corporation's
claim that the documents were confidential. 198 Justice Clark, writing for the
majority, found that the Census Act, which required the compilation of the
reports, did not award the documents the asserted protection. 199 Because
the requested documents were not offered protection from disclosure by the
Census Act, the corporation's claim could not be sustained.
Even though the 1990 Amendments require regulated parties to file nu-
merous reports concerning their compliance status, the Act only grants
those documents limited protection from disclosure. 20° If the Act is con-
strued strictly, regulated parties will not be able to protect the information
pursuant to traditional privileges. Furthermore, a partial disclosure of confi-
dential information could waive the attorney-client privilege as to all confi-
dential information on the subject matter of the disclosure.
The Act may weaken claims under the attorney-client privilege in two
ways. First, the disclosure requirements of the Act may simply force regu-
lated persons to release information that might otherwise be privileged. Sec-
ond, the increased criminalization of the Act broadens the scope of
communications that could come within the crime/fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege. For example, as every day of non-compliance con-
(holding that the right to assert a privilege against disclosure of certain bank records belonged
to the Government and could not be claimed or waived by a private party); MOORE, supra note
186, § 26.61[5.-2].
196. See Lamorte v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that a private
litigant can be compelled to produce copies of documents or testimony given to the SEC).
197. 368 U.S. 208 (1961).
198. Id. at 218.
199. Justice Clark stated:
We fully realize the importance to the public of the submission of free and full
reports to the Census Bureau, but we cannot rewrite the Census Act. It does not
require petitioner to keep a copy of its report nor does it grant copies of the
report not in the hands of the Census Bureau an immunity from legal process.
Ours is the duty to avoid a construction that would suppress otherwise compe-
tent evidence unless the statute, strictly construed, requires such a result. That
this statute does not do. Congress did not prohibit the use of reports per se but
merely restricted their use while in the hands of those persons receiving them,
i.e., the government officials.
Id.
200. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7414(c) (West Supp. 1991) (making all reports, records, or informa-
tion submitted to the EPA under the Act subject to public disclosure, except upon a showing
that the materials deserve to be treated as confidential so as not to divulge trade secrets).
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stitutes a violation, an attorney who knows of the client's violation may be
assisting the illegal activity. The scope of the reporting requirements signi-
fies Congress' belief that the public necessity to obtain such information out-
weighs a regulated person's private right to maintain the confidentiality of
that information.
E. Ethical Considerations
The 1990 Amendments specifically implicate a number of ethical consid-
erations for Texas lawyers who represent parties regulated under the Clean
Air Act. The increased criminalization of the Act may cause Texas attor-
neys to come into direct conflict with the mandates of the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct (Texas Disciplinary Rules). 20 1 Under the
Texas Disciplinary Rules, practitioners face strict requirements regarding
the maintenance of confidentiality of client information. The Texas Discipli-
nary Rules specifically demand that attorneys maintain the confidentiality of
two types of information. 20 2 The first type is client information protected by
the lawyer-client privilege described in Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 503, Tex. R. Crim.
Evid. 503, or by the principles of the attorney-client privilege defined in Fed.
R. Evid. 501.203 The second protected category is unprivileged client infor-
mation, which is much broader than the evidentiary privilege. Unprivileged
client information is defined as "all information relating to a client or fur-
nished by the client, other than privileged information, acquired by the law-
yer during the course of or by reason of the representation of the client. ''2°4
The definition of unprivileged client information includes materials that
otherwise would be unprotected and readily accessible to others, such as
publicly filed documents or conduct in hearings or other case proceedings.20 5
Generally, an attorney may not disclose confidential information of a cli-
ent or former client to either (1) any person that the client has instructed is
not to receive the information; or (2) anyone else, other than the client, the
client's representatives, or the members, associates, or employees of the at-
torney's law firm.2°6 Furthermore, even if a practitioner does not disclose
the confidential information of a client or former client, there are specific
mandates restricting the attorney from using the information to the client's
disadvantage without the client's consent. 20 7
201. The professional conduct of practitioners licensed in Texas after January 1, 1990, is
governed by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, promulgated by the Texas
Supreme Court on October 17, 1989. See SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, STATE BAR RULES art.
X, § 9 (Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct) Rule 1.01-8.05 (1990) [hereinafter
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT] (located in pocket part for Volume 3 of the
Texas Government Code in title 2, subtitle G app., following § 83.006 of the Government
Code).
202. Id. Rule 1.05(a).
203. Id. Rule 1.05(a).
204. Id.
205. CHARLES F. HERRING, JR., TEXAS LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND LAWYER DISCIPLINE
§ 4.25 (1991).
206. TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, supra note 201, Rule 1.05(b)(1).
207. Id. Rule 1.05(b)(2)-(3).
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The Texas Disciplinary Rules create certain exceptions to the general
rules of confidentiality that allow or require an attorney to disclose all or
part of a client's confidential information. A client may solicit the represen-
tation of a lawyer for the specific purposes of eliciting aid in illegal or fraud-
ulent conduct, or counsel may learn of such improper conduct at some point
after representation has begun. Depending upon the time and circumstances
under which information of improper conduct is acquired, different duties
may arise.20 8
First, an attorney may not assist or counsel a client in conduct that is
criminal or fraudulent.20 9 On the other hand, a lawyer may discuss the con-
sequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and present an
analysis of the legal aspects of questionable conduct. 210 The lawyer may not,
however, with impunity recommend the means by which a crime or fraud
may be committed. 2 1'
An attorney also has certain other affirmative duties when the issue of
criminal or fraudulent conduct arises. The Texas Disciplinary Rules create
disclosure guidelines pursuant to which an attorney may or must disclose
confidential client information.2 12 Specifically, counsel is permitted to reveal
confidential client information when the lawyer "has reason to believe it is
necessary" to comply with any of the Texas Disciplinary Rules or any other
law,2 13 to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act,
2 14
or to the extent reasonably necessary to rectify the consequences of a client's
criminal or fraudulent act committed using the lawyer's services.21 5 In addi-
tion, the attorney may have the obligation to make reasonable efforts to dis-
suade the client from committing the crime or fraud or persuade the client to
take necessary corrective action.21 6
An attorney must reveal confidential client information when the lawyer
has information clearly establishing that a client is likely to commit a crimi-
nal or fraudulent act that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm to a person. 21 7 Furthermore, an attorney must disclose confidential
208. HERRING, supra note 205, § 4.43.
209. TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, supra note 201, Rule 1.02(c). In a
situation where an attorney's services are innocently involved in past conduct by the client that
was criminal or fraudulent, the lawyer has not violated the Disciplinary Rules because to
"counsel or assist" criminal or fraudulent conduct requires knowing actions by that lawyer.
Id. Rule 1.02 comment 12.
210. Id. Rule 1.02(c) comment 7.
211. Id. Rule 1.02 comment 7.
212. Id. Rule 1.05(c)-(O.
213. Id. Rule 1.05(c)(4).
214. TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, supra note 201, Rule 1.05(c)(7).
215. Id., Rule 1.05(c)(8). In determining whether to make a permissive disclosure, an at-
torney should consider factors such as "the magnitude, proximity, and likelihood of the con-
templated wrong, the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who
might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction, and factors
that may extenuate the client's conduct in question." Such a disclosure should be no greater
than the attorney believes necessary to fulfill the limited protective purposes of the exceptions.
Id. Rule 1.05 comment 14.
216. Id. Rule 1.02(d), (e).
217. Id. Rule 1.05(e).
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information to a third person when the disclosure of a material fact to that
person is necessary to avoid making the lawyer a party to a criminal act or
knowingly assisting a client's fraudulent act.218 Counsel should limit these
revelations to only the information necessary to prevent the criminal or
fraudulent act.219
In addition to the disclosure requirements foisted upon attorneys by the
Texas Disciplinary Rules, counsel also may be permitted or required to with-
draw from representation because of the criminal or fraudulent acts of a
client. An attorney may withdraw from representing a client if that client
persists in a course of action involving the attorney's services that the attor-
ney reasonably believes may be criminal or fraudulent, or the client has used
the attorney's services to perpetuate a crime or fraud in the past.220 Counsel
must withdraw from the representation when a lawyer knows that the em-
ployment will result in the violation of a Disciplinary Rule or other law.221
Generally, a withdrawal from representation must be accomplished with the
utmost care taken so as not to adversely affect the clients interests.222
The 1990 Amendments will force attorneys representing regulated parties
to constantly confront and assess their ethical obligations under the Texas
Disciplinary Rules. Frequently, attorneys are hired to assist with the inter-
pretation of environmental audits conducted by a company itself or an envi-
ronmental consulting firm, that describe a company's compliance status with
regard to permitted emissions levels or other regulatory mandates. These
audits often contain information establishing the noncompliance of a regu-
lated party.
Under the 1990 Amendments, a regulated party may be required to con-
duct investigations to measure emissions levels and report any noncompli-
ance to the EPA. A party that fails or refuses to disclose information or that
misstates the severity of possible violations to the EPA is subject to criminal
sanction.223 If an attorney employed by a regulated party has knowledge of
confidential information that establishes such criminal violations, that attor-
ney may have a duty to take reasonable steps to dissuade the client from
conducting the criminal activity and may be permitted or even required to
disclose the relevant data.
The attorney has the duty to make a reasonable attempt to dissuade the
client from taking illegal actions224 and may disclose the client's intended
course of conduct 225 if the attorney reasonably believes it is necessary to do
so to prevent the regulated party from committing a criminal or fraudulent
act. An attorney also may be permitted to withdraw from the representation
218. Id. Rules 1.05(0, 4.01(b).
219. TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, supra note 201, Rule 1.05(e).
220. Id. Rule 1.15(b)(2)-(3).
221. Id. Rule 1.15(a) comment 2.
222. Id. Rule 1.15 comment 7.
223. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1991).
224. TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, supra note 201, Rule 1.02(d)
(1990) (this obligation only applies if the client is likely to commit a criminal or fraudulent act
that could likely result in substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another).
225. Id. Rule 1.05(c)(7).
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of a regulated party in these circumstances where the client does not adhere
to the attorney's advice and decides to proceed with conduct the lawyer rea-
sonably believes is criminal or fraudulent.226 The lawyer is not required to
discontinue representation of the regulated party, however, until the lawyer
knows that the conduct will be illegal or in violation of the Texas Discipli-
nary Rules.227
If during the course of representing a regulated party, an attorney comes
across confidential information clearly establishing that the client is likely to
take actions that are criminal or fraudulent and that are likely to cause the
death of or substantial bodily harm to a person, that attorney is required to
reveal the information to the extent reasonably necessary to prevent the ille-
gal act.228 The lawyer is also required to withdraw from representing the
regulated party where the lawyer knows that the employment will result in a
violation of the law or a Texas Disciplinary Rule.229 Problems arise for at-
torneys under the mandatory disclosure requirement of the Act in determin-
ing whether the scrutinized conduct will cause the death of or serious bodily
injury to a person. Attorneys confronted with this predicament will have to
address a number of issues in determining the extent of their obligation to
disclose the confidential information. For example, does it make a difference
if the client's violation occurs in a relatively unpopulated area as opposed to
a metropolitan center? What level of emissions are likely to cause death or
substantial injury to a person? Is continual exposure to a moderate level of a
regulated emissions likely to cause death or substantial injury to a person if
that party would not become noticeably affected by the exposure for many
years?
Attorneys possessing knowledge that their client is likely to commit a
criminal or fraudulent act also may have an obligation to withdraw their
representation of that party. If an attorney receives information that the
regulated party is engaging in a course of action, involving the attorney's
services, that the attorney reasonably believes may be a criminal violation of
a permit requirement or a provision of the Act, withdrawal from the repre-
sentation is permitted.230 Withdrawal is mandatory, however, if that attor-
ney knows that the asserted conduct is illegal or violates one of the Texas
Disciplinary Rules. 231
Furthermore, an audit of a client's emissions levels and other regulated
processes may reveal information establishing that the participating attor-
ney's services were used in the past to aid the client in the commission of a
criminal or fraudulent act. If an attorney uncovers such information, the
attorney may disclose such information if necessary to rectify the conse-
226. Id. Rule 1.15 comment 7.
227. Id.
228. Id. Rule 1.05(e).
229. TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, supra note 201, Rule 1.15(a)(1) &
comment 2.
230. Id. Rule 1.15(b)(2) comment 7.
23 1. Id. Rule 1.15 comment 2.
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quences of such acts.232 The attorney also should attempt to persuade the
client to take necessary remedial action.233 Finally, in this situation, the
lawyer has the right to withdraw from the representation. 234
The increased criminalization of the Act requires attorneys representing
regulated parties to be uniquely aware of their rights and obligations under
the Texas Disciplinary Rules. Even seemingly minute violations of permit
requirements or provisions of the Act can foist obligations on an attorney
that causes conflict with client interests. As the boundaries of the 1990
Amendments are delineated by regulations and rulings, the extent of coun-
sels' ethical obligations under the Act should become more well-defined.
Until that time, however, attorneys representing regulated parties must take
precautions to limit the friction between their ethical obligations under the
Texas Disciplinary Rules and their client's interests.
CONCLUSION
The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act will have wide-ranging ef-
fects on the activities of persons regulated by the Act and their representa-
tives. First, the 1990 Amendments have incorporated a significant number
of new enforcement mechanisms into the Act. The threat of being penalized
or prosecuted under one of these mechanisms should cause regulated parties
and employees of regulated parties to become more aware of compliance
status and to take specific actions to prevent or correct noncompliance.
Second, the amended Act may require regulated individuals to make a
number of periodic affirmative disclosures to the EPA regarding compliance
status. The compelled disclosure of compliance information may waive any
shield of confidentiality that once protected that information. Consequently,
regulated persons may lose any right to withhold that information from dis-
closure in an enforcement action or citizen suit.
Finally, the increased criminalization of the amended Act raises a number
of serious ethical considerations for Texas attorneys representing regulated
parties. The expansion of the Act's criminal penalties by the 1990 Amend-
ments will force Texas practitioners to constantly assess their ethical obliga-
tions under the Texas Disciplinary Rules. Until the boundaries of the new
provisions become more defined, Texas attorneys will be required to take
extensive precautions to reduce conflict between their ethical obligations and
client interests.
The 1990 Amendments enact changes to the Clean Air Act supporting the
growing public sentiment to hold persons strictly culpable for their actions
that place an unwarranted burden on the environment. Persons seeking to
operate within the terms of the Act are faced with extended liability and a
corresponding loss of personal protections when contesting alleged viola-
tions of the regulatory scheme. Consequently, regulated individuals will be
232. Id. Rule 1.05(c)(8).
233. Id. Rule 1.02(e).
234. TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, supra note 201, Rule 1.05(b)(3)
comment 7.
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compelled to exercise extreme caution in conducting activities regulated by
the amended Clean Air Act.

